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Right Of Owner Of Personal Property
To Challenge Assessments
Of Real Property
National Can Company v. State Tax Commission'
The taxpayer, National, appealed from the assessment
for the year 1957 of its tangible personal property,2 levied
by the Maryland State Tax Commission pursuant to the
Maryland Code, Article 81, Sections 6, 14, and 15, as
amended by Chapter 73 of the Maryland Laws of 1958.-
The appeal was taken to test the validity of the provisions
of Chapter 73 separately classifying real and personal prop-
erty, and the right of National to challenge the inflation
factor provided for in Chapter 73 with respect to the valua-
tion of real property. The lower court upheld the Com-
mission's assessment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals
found that amendments introduced by Chapter 73 were
valid and constitutional under both the Maryland Constitu-
tion and the Federal Constitution, and that National was
not permitted to challenge the inflation factor.
The Court of Appeals noted that this case was a sequel
to the case of Sears, Roebuck v. State Tax Commission,4
in which it held that the assessment practice of the State
1220 Md. 418, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959).
2The aggregate assessed value of the taxpayer's property exceeded
$5,200,000, some $3,737,000 being placed on manufactured products and
raw material and $1,432,000 on tools and machinery used for manu-
facturing.
8MD. CODE (1957). Chapter 73 was approved April 4, 1958, and the
order of the lower court in the present case (Circuit Oourt No. 2 of
Baltimore City, Joseph L. Carter, J.) was given April 8, 1958. The appeal
to the Court of Appeals was decided July 9, 1959.
§ 14 of MD. CODE (1957), Art. 81, as amended by MD. LAWS 1958, Ch.
73, effective January 1, .1957, and reads as follows:
Sec. 14. (a) (Classification) Real and personal property shall be sepa-
rately classified, and personal property separately sub-
classified for assessment purposes. The following shall be
separately sub-classified for purposes of personal property
assessment:
(b) (Method of Assessment) Except as hereinafter provided:
(1) all real property directed in this Article to be assessed,
shall be assessed at the full cash value thereof on the date
of finality. The term full cash value as used in this sub-
section shall mean current value less an allowance for
inflation, if in fact inflation exists.
(2) All personal property directed in this Article to be
assessed, shall be assessed at the full cash value thereof
on the date of finality. The term full cash value as used
in this subsection shall mean current value without any
allowance for inflation.
The "date of finality" mentioned in subsection (b), as defined by Art.
81, § 31(c) and as applicable to National's assessment for the year 1957,
was January 1, 1957.
'214 Md. 550, 136 A. 2d 567 (1957) ; noted 18 Md. L. Rev. 66 (1958).
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Tax Commission of making a deduction from the "full cash
value" of real property for inflation, but denying a com-
parable deduction from the value of personal property was
a discrimination not authorized by the then existing law5
and that an owner iof personal property was entitled to re-
lief by having his assessment lowered. As a result of the
Sears decision of November 22, 1957,6 the legislature en-
acted Chapter 73.
In the present case, -the Court stressed that in the
Sears case7 it based its decision not upon Article 15 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights,' but rather upon the
pertinent Maryland statute. The Sears decision, in requir-
ing the Tax Commission to lower Sears' assessment to that
percentage of value applied to real property, relied on the
"equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution (".. . No State shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.") The Court of Appeals in the Sears case
followed the decisions of Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota
County9 and Hillsborough v. Cromwell,0 which interpreted
the equal protection clause as requiring that discriminatory
treatment of a taxpayer be remedied either by increasing
the same taxes of other members of the same class or by
reducing the tax against the complainant; and, moreover,
that the State itself must remove the discrimination and
5 MD. CODE (1951), Art. 81, § 13(a) :
"Except as hereinafter provided, all property directed in this article
to be assessed, shall be assessed at the full cash value thereof on the
date of finality . . ."
This may be compared with the excerpt from Art. 81 as amended by
Ch. 73, supra, n. 3.
6 Supra, n. 4.
7Supra, n. 4.
8 Art. 15 does In fact permit separate assessment of real and per-
sonal property :
.. . [T]he General Assembly shall . . . provide for separate assess-
ment of land and classification and sub-classification of improvements
on land and personal property, as it may deem proper; and all taxes
thereafter provided to be levied by the State for the support of the
general State Government, and by the counties and by the City
of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform as to
land within the taxing district, and uniform within the class or sub-
class of improvements on land or personal property which the re-
spective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to the
tax levy; . . ."
The above section of Art. 15 was substituted in 1915 for the following
provision:
".. E. [B]ut every other person in the State, or person holding
property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes,
for the support of government, according to his actual worth in
real or personal property;
'260 U. S. 441 (1923).10326 U. S. 620 (1946).
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may not place on the taxpayer the burden of seeking up-
ward revision of the taxes of other members of the same
class.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals ruled that sepa-
rate classification, for purposes of taxation, of real and per-
sonal property is permissible under Article 15 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights and under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution so long as such classification is reasonable, and found
that the classification in the amended statute was reason-
able. The opinion continued that, even if it were assumed
that the provision for an inflation factor is invalid, the pro-
vision for taxation of personal property at full cash value
would remain in full force. Therefore the Court indicated
that the appellant, since it had not demonstrated that the
statute discriminated unreasonably against personal prop-
erty, was in no position to challenge the provision allowing
an inflation factor in assessment of real property. The
majority opinion found the situation in this case to be
clearly distinguished from that in the Sears case," where
the inflation factor was applied to real property without
benefit of a statute separately classifying real and personal
property.12
The Court, referring to the preamble to Chapter 73,13
pointed quite clearly to the principle which was determina-
tive of the instant case:
"The preamble of the Act (Par. (5)) speaks of the
inherent differences between real and personal prop-
erty and the peculiarities of certain classes of personal
property (first) as requiring and justifying separate
classification and sub-classification for assessment
purposes and (second) as requiring and justifying the
making 'of an allowance for inflation with respect to
real estate but not personal property. Other recitals
Supra, n. 4.
The appellant, National, in addition to its argument that the sepa-
rate classification of real and personal property was discriminatory, had
urged that the attempt to make the statute retroactive to January 1,
1957 was invalid withiout regard to its other provisions. The majority
opinion concluded with a thorough consideration of the provisions of
Chapter 73 as to retroactivity and found them valid.
The fifth paragraph of the preamble is as follows:
"Whereas, it is the belief of the General Assembly that the natural
and inherent differences between real and personal property, and the
peculiarities of certain classes of personal property require and
justify separate classification and sub-classification for assessment
purposes as aforesaid, and require and' justify the making of an
allowance for inflation in respect to real estate assessments but not
in respect to personal property assessments;".
19601
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
show, we think, that inflation at least prompted the
adoption of the statute.... [W]e cannot say that the
legislative classification based upon the finding stated
in preamble clause (5), supra is unsustainable. There
is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of a
legislative finding."' 4
In dissent, Judge Henderson strongly criticizes the
majority interpretation of the separability provision of
Chapter 73. His opinion does not argue that Article 15
of the Declaration of Rights requires uniformity of tax
rates or assessments between real and personal property;
however, he questions the arguments of the majority that
the Legislature was, independent of the provision in
Chapter 73 for the inflation factor, exercising its power to
classify. Judge Henderson argues that, on the contrary,
the declared reason for the enactment of Chapter 73 was
to continue legally the disparity which the Sears case"
had found to be illegal. Since he finds the only purpose
of the classification required by Chapter 73 to be the perpet-
uation of the disparity in assessments, he maintains that
National may properly attack the vagueness of the pro-
vision for an inflation factor, that provision being the
means of discrimination. As a consequence, the State could
reasonably be required, under the precedent of Hills-
borough v. Cromwell'6 which was followed in the Sears
case, to remove the discrimination if the provision sustain-
ing it were shown by the appellant to be invalid.
Judge Henderson proceeds to consider the appellant's
charge of vagueness and improper delegation of the taxing
power, and finds subsection 14(b) (1), as enacted by
Chapter 73, to be a hopelessly inadequate guide for assess-
ment. The provision for valuation of real property sug-
gests no previous price level by which inflation is to be
measured, nor any other objective standard for defining
inflation.'7 Judge Henderson further disputes the argument
-"220 Md. 418, 432, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959). The Court continues with
a quotation from Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 210 Md. 58, 62, 92 A. 2d 560
(1952) :
"'An invalid act eannot be made valid by a "preface of generalities"
in the form of a legislative declaration of purpose. Schechter V. United
States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 . . .But if a legislative declaration
is not demonstrably untrue or meaningless, and if true, would sup-
port the validity of the act, the courts must accept the judgment of
the legislature and cannot substitute a contrary judgment of their
own.'s"
'214 Md. 550, 136 A. 2d 567 (1957), noted 18 Md. L. Rev. 66 (1958).
18 Supra, n. 10.
17The dissenting opinion, 220 Md. 418, 445, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959), states:
"[T]he amount to be allowed would depend in each case upon the
[VOL. XX
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of the Commission that the term "full cash value" is equally
vague; that term, he says, has come to have a definite,
objective meaning, whereas "inflation" has not.'"
It seems thoroughly established that the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits
different classes of property to be taxed at different rates,
provided the classification is reasonable.19 Neither the
majority nor the dissent of this case questions this. The
Court is at pains to show that the classification provided by
Chapter 73 is a reasonable one, citing what it feels are
very pertinent differences between real and personal prop-
erty.20 The majority does not feel that, in view of these
differences and of the provision in Article 15 of the Mary-
land Constitution permitting separate classification, it
would be warranted in declaring Chapter 73 invalid. It
would be difficult to deny the right of the Court to thus
avoid encroachment upon legislative prerogative, or the
propriety of the restraint with which it reviews Chapter 73.
It is not so difficult, however, to question the wisdom
of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 73. The criticism
point of reference, which is not designated. Inflation exists both
as regards real and personal property. Its amount depends on the
arbitrary selection of a previous price level. As I see it, the legis-
lative directive is an open invitation to the taxing authorities to
reduce assessments on real estate to whatever percentage of full
cash value they please. This was precisely the vice we found in
the Sear8 case. The directive supplies no point of reference, and
hence leaves the matter to the uncontrolled discretion of the taxing
authorities, without any objective standard at all."
IsHow definite the meaning of "full cash value" is could be disputed;
see Tam Assessments of Real Property: A Propo8al for Legislative Re-
form, 68 Yale L. J. 335, 344 (1958). There is little doubt that "inflation"
under Maryland assessment practices is a term of uncertain and unpre-
dictable meaning. While unchallenged testimony in the present case
would seem to imply that the usual deduction for inflation by the State
Tax Oommission is about 40 percent, it was indicated in the Sears decision
that deductions ranged from 40 to 75 percent.
IABell's Gap R'd Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890); Michigan
Central Railroad v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245 (1906) ; Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911). Corwin, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITID STATES (Library of Congress Edition, 1952) 1152, states both
this principle and its limits:
"Intentional and systematic undervaluation by State officials of other
taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right
of one taxed upon the full value of his property (Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U. S. 350 (1918); Raymond v. Chicago
Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 35, 37 (1907)) . . . Differences in
the basis of assessment are not invalid where the person or property
affected might properly be placed in a separate class for purposes of
taxation. (Charleston Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182 (1945) ; Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940)). An owner
aggrieved by discrimination is entitled to have his assessment reduced
to the common level."
The same principle was reaffirmed very recently in Allied Stores of Ohio
v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526, 527, 528 (1959).
'°220 Md. 418, 433, 434, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959).
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in the dissenting opinion of the vague mandate to assess
with an allowance for inflation, now embodied in sub-
section 14(b) (1) of Article 81, should be viewed against
the background of assessment practices both in Maryland
and in other States. The Maryland statute is apparently
unique, among State constitutional and statutory provisions
governing assessment, in its express reference to inflation.2'
However, the same consideration appears less explicitly
in many other jurisdictions where assessors have hesitated
to raise assessments of real property from pre-World War
II levels.22 It is generally accepted that assessment of prop-
erty should be as objective as possible and - at least
within particular classes - uniform. In many jurisdictions,
if not most, the reality must fall far short of this ideal;
nor is the situation necessarily better even if a State consti-
tution, as Maryland's before 1915,28 or statute (as Article
81 before enactment of Chapter 73) apparently requires
complete equality without regard to classes. Facts brought
out in the Sears case indicated that deductions for inflation
in Maryland assessments had ranged from 40 to 75 per
cent. 4 Somewhat similar situations have lately cropped up
in two nearby States. In New Jersey, shockingly discrepant
variations 'between counties in percentage of assessments
used for taxation have been found and have been over-
thrown by the courts.25 In Connecticut a recent decision
found certain assessments void for lack of uniformity.0
The Maryland Legislature and the State Tax Com-
mission have attempted to insure some uniformity and
objectivity in assessment throughout this State. Over a
period of years commencing in 1935 a system of rotating
21 Tao Asses8ments of Reat Property: A Proposal for Legi8lative Re-
form, 68 Yale L. J., 335, 355 and chart 'opposite 386 (1958).
22Ibid., 355 :
"Even after the economic tide had turned and inflationary pressures
increased the revenue demands of municipalities, 'normal market'
concepts remained in vogue. Nor have they been abandoned despite
continued pressures for the release of additional taxing, borrowing,
and spending power. The judiciary has evidently recognized the
inequity of abandoning the normal-market standard before taxpayers
could recoup their overpayments in depression years. In any event,
courts have not overruled the assessors' adherence to that standard.
Thus, taxpayers have benefited from the implicit extension of judi-
cial language about inherent value to cover an area- valuations in
inflationary periods - almbst completely free of legislative guide-
posts. Today, assessments are made and reviewed In terms of a
normal period, usually one somewhere around 1940."
Supra, circa n, 7, 8.
Supra, n. 14.
1 See 'Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Tax., 16 N.J.
329, 108 A. 2d 598 (1954).
E. Ingraham Company v. Town and City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374,
132 A. 2d 563 (1957), cited in 18 Md. L. Rev. 66, 69, n. 10 (1958).
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reassessments was authorized, in order that all taxable
property in each county and Baltimore City might be
periodically reassessed.27 It is difficult to believe that
Chapter 73 represents a further step forward. If an owner
of real property believes that his assessment is too high,
relative to other owners, the -burden of showing this un-
doubtedly rests on him. Where real estate has been gen-
erally underassessed, proof of discrimination may be diffi-
cult to obtain under any circumstances.28 In view of the en-
actment of Chapter 73 and of the present decision, it is ap-
parent that such an aggrieved owner of real property will
be forced to contend with a mysterious variable of infla-
tion which seems to be for the first time, firmly established
in Maryland law. However, some question arises as to
whether the inflation factor attacked by National in the
present case on the ground iof vagueness would be sustained
if attacked by an owner of real property.
JAMES P. LEWIS
Insurance - Right Of Insurer To Subrogate
To Collateral Contract Rights
Of The Insured
In The Matter Of Future Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc.1
Future Manufacturing purchased certain refrigeration
equipment from the Scatena York Company under a con-
ditional sales contract which among other things provided
that the vendee was to have the equipment insured against
fire for the benefit of the vendor and that the vendee would
remain liable for the purchase price should the property
be destroyed before such price was fully paid. Future
failed to have the equipment insured, but Scatena York,
on its own initiative, procured the desired coverage. Subse-
quently the equipment was destroyed by fire while
$17,654.88 of the purchase price remained unpaid. Scatena
2 Rogan v. Commrs. of Calvert County, 194 Md. 299, 71 A. 2d, 47 (1950),
discusses these efforts. See also Lewis, THE TAx ARTICLES OF THE MARY-
LAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 13 Md. L. Rev. 83 (1953).
2" When general undervaluation exists, the taxpayer may have to prove
not only the proper tax value of his realty but also, through an independent
appraisal of similar property, that his realty is assessed above the
general level." Tax Assessments of Real Property: A Proposal for Legis-
lative Reform, 68 Yale L. J., 335, 348 (1958). Tax Comm. v. -Brandt Cabinet
Works, 202 Md. 533, 97 A. 2d 290 (1953), is illustrative of the difficulty
of challenging an assessment where the inflation factor has been employed.
1165 F. 'Supp. 111 (D.C. N.D. Cal. S.D. 1958).
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